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ABSTRACTS 
Studies conducted in the private equity industry have largely focused on the United 
States and Europe. Even so, issues relating to the investment performance of private 
equity have not featured strongly. This study addresses these two omissions by studying 
the factors affecting the investment performance exhibited by the Asian private equity 
funds. It is found that over a number of years of investment experience, asset under 
management, and investment stage diversification are factors that contribute to an 
increase in investment performance. Number of funds managed and number of 
professional staff have a negative relationship with performance. The paper shows that 
diversification, in terms of geographic and industrial, as a means to control risk is only a 
winning strategy for large-sized venture capitalists. For others, only a certain amount of 
diversification at the investment stage is desirable. One possible winning strategy for 
Asian private equity firms is to specialize in an industry and to diversify across different 
stages and countries within this industry. The paper also suggests that investment 
returns do depend on some uncontrollable and external factors like (1) cultural 
differences; (2) regulatory problems and inefficient stock market in Asia; (3) economic 
and political instabilities; and (4) insufficient deal flow and investment opportunities 
available. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Earlier research in private equity field has focused on U.S. and European studies (for 
example, Amit et al, 1998, Fells, 1984, Reid, 1996). However, little research has been 
conducted on the Asian private equity industry. This is somewhat surprising given its 
long history and growing size. 
Investment performance is an important issue in the private equity industry and 
therefore should receive research attention. In Asia, there is a persistent gap between 
initial expectation and ultimate performance. The inability to deliver the internal rate of 
return promoted in the Private Placement Memorandums, however, has not stopped a 
record number of funds (for example, the number of private equity funds in Hong Kong 
increased from about 130 in 1998 to over 200 in recent months丨）being raising in the 
market, seeking ever-larger cheques from public and private pension funds, large 
corporations, as well as high net-worth individuals. Some venture capitalists suggest 
that many of the Asian funds are not successful in producing the required / expected 
returns. Clearly, the primary problem with the Asian private equity industry at the 
‘estimated by an investment professional (one of the interviewees) in private equity industry. 
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moment is returns. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask what determines the investment 
performance of a private equity firm (PEF). 
Wright and Robbie (1998: 521) defines venture capital (for a complete guide on 
private equity market, see Fenn, Liang & Prowse, 1995) as “the investment by 
professional investors of long-term, unquoted, risk equity finance in new firms where the 
primary reward is an eventual capital gain, supplemented by dividend yield." They 
invest in privately held companies that are not quite visible to the public and add value to 
those companies by utilizing their experience and skills, capitalizing on their connections, 
hiring high quality investment professionals, and conducting due diligence. Their focus 
on privately held companies explains why sometimes they are called private equity 
investors. 
Within the private equity world, professionals and commentators are arguing that 
some external / uncontrollable factors like the illiquid initial public offering (IPO) market 
and insufficient deal flow in Asia are the main reasons why they were less successful 
than expected. They often complain that it is first, difficult to find investments in Asia 
because of the lack of real innovative and hi-tech companies, and second, difficult to exit 
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their investments in the Asia due to the limited financing abilities and efficiencies in the 
stock markets. Although these are possible reasons, it is unclear whether they are the 
main reasons accounting for the unsatisfactory performance of Asian private equity firms. 
Asia is a big place, after all, with seemingly limitless fast-growth businesses. It is 
interesting to see how the internal and more controllable factors (for example, investment 
strategy adopted by private equity firms) are affecting their performance. 
This paper is related to several bodies of literature. First, it is related to a body of 
literature, which is surprisingly limited, regarding the Asian private equity industry. 
Second, it has a link to an extensive corporate finance literature about the relationship 
between organizational structure and corporate performance (e.g., Jensen (1993)). More 
specifically, this paper is related to the very limited body of literature connecting private 
equity partnerships with investment performance. This also raises questions about the 
necessity of the partnership structure employed by independent private equity funds. 
Third, this paper is related to a body of literature which addresses the relationship 
between investment strategy (specialization vs. diversification) and investment 
performance. Furthermore, it relates to some miscellaneous topics like human capital, 
compensation issue, board seats, percentage ownership in portfolio companies, 
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percentage ownership by general partners, flexibility in investment (measured by the 
difference between the minimum allowed and maximum allowed investment) in the 
private equity and finance literature. Some of them like investment flexibility, 
percentage ownership by general partners, and human capital have been largely neglected 
by the researchers of this field. 
Overall, as far as I am aware, no paper has analyzed the impact made by all the 
above factors on the private equity firm investment performance in the Asian context. 
Before proceeding, I should mention several important things about this paper. 
First, this is a structure-performance and strategy-performance study and not a structure-
strategy study. Second, the terms "private equity" and "venture capital" have been used 
interchangeably in the extant literature. While venture capital tends to be viewed 
narrowly as referring to new firms, in this paper I tend to use private equity and private 
equity firms (PEFs) much more because it has a broader definition (also involves 
investments in management buy-outs and buy-ins and pre-IPO stage etc.). Clearly, the 
focus of this paper is not solely venture capital firms which invest mainly on start-up 
companies. However, sometimes the term venture capital is still unavoidably used 
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especially when I refer to some extant literature which tends to use venture capital much 
more often. Third, this paper does not deal with all aspects and factors affecting the 
investment performance of private equity funds. Four, it primarily deals with the 
relationship between PEFs and their portfolio companies, not that between investors (like 
pension funds) of PEFs and the PEFs themselves. Further, it has a focus on the private 
equity firm, rather than the new venture firm. For example, it deals with the structure 
and investment strategy of private equity funds but does not deal with the quality and/or 
experience of entrepreneurs. Five, while it investigates the subject area in the context of 
several Asian countries, it is region-specific rather than country-specific. 
Research Objectives 
As Asian private equity activities are increasing, more research should be done in 
the region. In this paper, I am not aiming to replicate approaches and issues covered in 
the US and European literature in an Asian context. Instead, I attempt to identify issues 
which have been largely neglected in the extant literature. The overall aim of this 
research is to contribute towards our understanding on the performance exhibited by 
Asian PEFs. 
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Surprisingly, in the private equity literature, research focusing on PEF performance 
is lacking. Venture capital firms face pressure to seek lower risk investments, improve 
rates of return, and provide values to new venture development. Few researchers have 
begun to investigate the strategies they are aiming to implement in order to deal with this 
increasing pressure. 
As suggested by Wright and Robbie (1998), outside of the United States this is 
partly because of the relative newness of most markets where venture capital portfolios 
have not generally reached maturity. Another reason provided by the authors is poor 
access to adequate and accurate data. Perhaps because of the same reasons, Asian 
private equity industry has received little research attention, despite its long history and 
growing size. On the other hand, while there is a debate on what investment strategy 
(specialization or diversification policy) private equity investors should use, little 
research has been done to relate the investment strategies to performance. 
As mentioned at the outset, this paper addresses these two omissions by examining 
what factors are affecting Asian PEF performance. This paper has three objectives in 
particular. One, it contributes to the limited body of literature on the Asian private 
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equity industry and serves as an overview. Two, it attempts to find out the factors which 
are affecting the performance of Asian PEFs. Three, using the insights obtained from 
both primary and secondary sources, this paper suggests what Asian PEFs might do to 
improve their performance. 
Organization of This Paper 
The paper is divided into seven parts. After the introduction part, the Asian private 
equity market is overviewed in the following chapter. This is followed by a succinct 
review of the related literature and then hypothesis setting. Followed by that, I will 
describe the research methodology. After this, the empirical analysis will be presented 
and discussed. Finally, I will conclude the paper, point out the limitations of this 
research, and suggest possible future research directions. 
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II THE ASIAN PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW 
Venture capitalists and private equity investors are used to playing a small role in 
Asian financed Unlike their American and European counterparts, which focus on 
investments in start-up firms (considered to be the staple of their business), funds in Asia 
have long been geared toward providing expansion capital to well-established businesses^ 
regardless of whether the funds are local or foreign affiliated. According to Dan 
Schwartz, publisher of Asian Venture Capital Journal in Hong Kong, there are billions of 
funds remaining un-invested, regardless of the seemingly abundant opportunities in the 
region. 
According to Asian Venture Capital Journal, the pool of private equity funds under 
management is substantial - jus t under US$46 billion in 1998 for all of Asia, and the 
amount has been growing*. In 1998, more than 7,400 new funds were raised in Asia'. 
Nowadays, private equity investors in Asia mainly focus on three categories, early stage 
2 For a complete guide on Venture Capital in Asia, please see The 2000 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, 
published by the Asian Venture Capital Journal; please also see figures 1-6, 8 and table 7 in Appendix I for 
general statistics / information on the Asian venture capital industry. 
3 See figure 7 in Appendix I. 
4 See figure 1 in Appendix I. 
5 See figure 2 in Appendix I. 
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high tech opportunities, mezzanine^ and later stage companies, and restructuring 
situations (including management buyouts / buy-ins (for more discussion on MBO，please 
see, for example, Kaplan, 1989)). 
A great deal of private money going into intermediate or incremental applications of 
hi-technology in Asia is largely a result of the conscious policies of governments as 
suggested by Matthew (1992). Asian governments have provided infant industries with 
incentives. For a long time, they have guided and helped private entrepreneurs along 
the most profitable path. As reported by Asian Finance (1990-1991), with government 
support, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have bolstered their venture 
capital stakes through comprehensive tax incentives and government financial assistance 
programs. In Korea, the government remains the chief sponsor of venture capital 
projects. Regarded by many as the fastest growing private equity market in Asia after 
Japan, Taiwan, on the other hand, has been feeling alone in stressing high-technology 
projects. Besides, it is observed that in Singapore, the private equity strategy is 
outward-looking and international-oriented. 
6 This is most often the last stage of venture capital raising before IPO. Sometimes, mezzanine fund 
raising is intended more to bring in strategic shareholders than to raise capital. It helps venture companies 
in "window dressing" that is less important in earlier stages. Mezzanine funding also allows cleaning up 
the balance sheet before floating. 
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As noted by Folta (1999), there are different types of private equity fund in China. 
Most of them are based in Hong Kong, but some have head offices in Beijing. Other 
funds invest in China from elsewhere in Asia or from the United States or Europe. 
Some private equity funds are joint venture management groups whereas some of them 
are foreign-controlled. Chang et al. (1991) provide a nice discussion about such 
entrepreneurism in China. 
Even though there seem to be many opportunities floating in Asia, private equity 
funds targeting Asia have faced difficulties in finding profitable investment opportunities, 
according to Pohndorf (1997). Despite the Asian financial crisis, they have had no 
trouble raising money: America's big institutional investors, and more and more of 
Europe's, are bewitched by the idea of getting a piece of Asia's fast-growth action. 
A lot of funds are queuing up and waiting for profitable and exit-able investment 
opportunities. Many of the funds still are not finding the investments. The problem is 
that there are so many funds that too much money is chasing too few available deals of 
quality. Because of their family-owned characteristic, most Asian companies are 
reluctant to bring in outside investors, even as minority investors or joint venture partners. 
1 0 
Because of their culture, specifically negative impression to debts, Asian entrepreneurs 
have traditionally capitalized by their families. This culture remains there as an 
aversion to corporate / marketable debt is generally noticeable. Also, Asia's hottest 
economies have unusually high saving rates and do not need outsiders' capital. Many of 
their smaller and newer ventures are earmarked for young family members to take over, 
not for public flotation or for sale to strategic corporate buyers — the two most common 
ways for private equity funds to exit their investments. The competition among Asian 
funds is so keen and that explains why they are exceptionally secretive about their deals 
(and this helps explain why "hard" data is hard to get in Asia). The long-term under-
performance of IPO, on the other hand, may also reduce the demand of private equity 
funds (see, for example, McGuinness (1993) for Hong Kong). Even worse, the 
difficulty private equity investors face in exiting their investments in the illiquid stock 
markets in Asia significantly affects their investment performance. Besides, unlike the 
United States, a buyout market has yet to emerge in Asia, and start-up capital is usually 
limited to Hong Kong. 
To get down to the basics, the region desperately needs technologies and 
management systems required to boost productivity. So, PEFs should at least have a 
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role to play in Asia. Another positive is that after the Asian crisis, there is a large need 
for financial restructuring. During the crisis, companies in countries like Thailand, 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines required capital but were 
discouraged by high interest rates. Credit has dried up as banks struggle with bad debts, 
and falling stock markets making the IPO almost impossible. Private equity investors, 
though may not be the only source, should be one of the very few viable capital sources. 
Furthermore, there is a clear trend that the American private equity funds are looking for 
international private equity investment opportunities as the competition in their home 
country starts to become strong. In addition, cyclical nature of the industry means 
diversifying across countries and / or regions is a feasible strategy for their survival in the 
long-term. Changing attitudes are also helping create more private equity opportunities 
in Asia. The financial crisis coupled with globalization trend are slowly opening the 
relatively closed culture of family-owned companies in the region. More and more 
firms are welcoming outside investors in an effort to survive and further, to outperform 
their competitors. 
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Il l LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on the Private Equity Industry in General 
Wright and Robbie (1998) offer a comprehensive review on venture capital and 
private equity. They compare the traditional corporate finance theory with venture 
capital. Sahlman's (1990) paper explains venture capital and its organizational setting. 
The survey paper of Norton and Tenenbaum (1993), on the other hand, takes a more 
managerial direction than Sahlman's. 
There are many research papers focusing on venture capitalists. Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) surveyed venture capitalists and asked how they spend their time. They 
found that venture capitalists spend roughly 50% of their time monitoring an average of 
nine portfolio companies. They spend an average of 110 hours per year working with 
each portfolio firm, and their most frequent activity is assisting the firm in raising 
additional funds. 
While some researchers investigate the investment criteria used by venture capitalists 
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(see, for example, Knight, 1994 and Zutshi et al., 1999)，some other researchers focus on 
venture capital fundraising (for example, Gompers and Lerner, (1999)). 
套 
Gupta and Sapienza (1992) identify factors that help explain variations in 
preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of venture capital 
firms' investments. One major finding is that venture capital firms specializing in early 
stage ventures prefer less industry diversity and narrower geographic scope relative to 
other venture capital firms. Another major finding is that larger venture capital firms 
prefer greater industry diversity and broader geographic scope than do the smaller ones. 
Regarding venture capital investing, one source of complexity is the existence of 
multiple principal-agent relationships operating at the same time. On the one hand, the 
venture capitalist (agent) has a set of investors (principal) in each fund that is under 
management and has incentives to continue soliciting new fund. The venture capitalist 
(principal), on the other hand, has a portfolio of investing companies (agent) that he / she 
is investing in. Reid (1996) develops a framework for applied principal-agent analysis 
with a focus on risk management and information. 
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There are some research studies that focus on the entrepreneurial side like the topic 
of new venture performance (for example, McDougall et al.，1992 and Brush and 
Vanderwerf, 1992). 
Research on the Asian Private Equity Industry 
While research on Asian PEFs is somewhat embryonic, there is some useful 
documented evidence. Baum (1998) has discussed the role of Taiwanese PEFs in the 
development of hi-tech firms in Taiwan. Ahn (1998) has discussed the South Korean 
private equity industry after the Asian crisis. In China, private equity has reached a new 
level of prominence since the mid-1990s. In his in-depth overview, Folta (1999) 
discussed the private equity industry in China as well as in Asia. He pointed out that 
private equity groups working in China have, in recent years, helped many traditional 
participants in the establishment and expansion of industrial, service, infrastructure, and 
new technology projects by enhancing their abilities. 
1 5 
IV. HYPOTHESIS SETTING 
Private Equity Firm Structure 
There are various types of venture capital organizations. Most of the literature 
tends to stress the limited partnership form but there are others (Barry, 1994). There are, 
for example, public venture capital funds, and there are captive venture capital firms. 
Because venture capitalists operating within different organization forms differ in 
their relationships with their principal investors, their behavior may be expected to be 
different: they may follow different investment strategies and they may exhibit 
differences in performance (Barry, 1994). 
The reliance of PEFs on limited partnerships with profit-sharing scheme is often 
noted to be critical to their success. Jensen (1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
among others, have attributed the rapid growth of private equity organizations to the 
ways in which their design addresses moral hazard and information asymmetry problems. 
These claims, however, have received limited empirical scrutiny even in the U.S. context， 
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let alone in the Asian context. As far as I am aware, there is only one exception. In 
comparing investments made by traditional venture capital organizations with those of 
venture funds sponsored by corporations, Gompers and Lemer (1998) conclude in their 
paper that the structure of corporate venture funds is not a critical barrier. Corporate 
venture investments in entrepreneurial firms appear to be at least as successful (using 
measures such as the probability of the portfolio firm going public) as those backed by 
independent venture organizations, particularly when there is a strategic overlap between 
the corporate parent and the portfolio firm. 
To put the theory to the test in the Asian context, I offer my first hypothesis: 
HI: PEFs with limited partnership structure have better investment 
performance than other PEFs do. 
Specialization vs. Diversification 
Venture capitalists typically specialize by emphasizing a particular industry, such as 
biotechnology, or by emphasizing a particular stage of development, such as start-up 
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companies or companies in the expansion stage (Barry, 1994). 
For example, some PEFs may invest in technology exclusively in Taiwan. In 
Malaysia and Singapore, again, it is predominantly technology. But in Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines they have little investment in high-tech firms. So, the 
point is that in investing in some countries, specialization is key and there is no need for 
diversification. 
The Asia Infrastructure Fund has pointed out that the demand for private equity 
capital for infrastructure in Asia is so great that rising money is the least of their concerns 
(McGoldrick, 1997). This interesting phenomenon strongly suggests that in some 
investment areas, “too much money chasing too few deals", which is believed to be an 
excellent description of the Asian private equity industry, is not applicable. A buyer's 
market appears in some industries like infrastructure market and this tends to support the 
specialization argument. 
Theoretically, an information-sharing argument supports specialization. Venture 
capitalists and private equity investors usually have information or transaction cost 
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advantages over other investors (Bygrave 1988). In discussing the structure and 
governance of venture capital organizations, Sahlman (1990) provides the argument that 
learning curve effects arise from the venture capitalist's specialized activity. The 
venture capitalists benefit from gaining institutional knowledge, sharing it with other 
investors and gatekeepers, earning a reputation for their experience and expertise, and 
enhancing deal flow and making extraordinary profits. 
According to Norton and Tenenbaum (1993), the assumption of complete 
diversification is not appropriate because some investors have cost advantages over 
others. They argue that venture capital firms will use their expertise to specialize in 
certain technical and product areas. Further, due to their information advantage in 
certain technologies and/or markets, and the high fixed costs of gaining expertise in other 
technical and product areas, it does not make perfect sense for them to seek portfolio 
diversification. 
The authors point out that risks should still be managed, however. Venture 
capitalists seek to manage operating and technical risks by gaining access, using their 
reputation and experience in their specialization, to information flows and deal flows in 
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networks. This also explains why some venture capitalists will invite other venture 
capitalists to reduce not only the financial burden but also their risks by allowing the 
joining venture capitalists to participate and contribute their specialized knowledge (to 
add value). Information sharing and specialization, therefore, is considered an effective 
means to control risk. 
While there is little research conducted in relating specialization strategy to 
investment performance, the empirical results in the study of Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1993), where 98 venture capitalists were surveyed, indicate that venture capitalists 
apparently use specialization and information-sharing strategies to control risk rather than 
financial diversification. By examining an exhaustive set of IPOs by venture-capital-
backed companies between 1978 and 1987, Barry ei al. (1990) find that venture 
capitalists specialize their investments in firms to develop expertise and provide intensive 
monitoring services. For example, they take concentrated equity positions, maintain 
their investment beyond the IPO, and serve on the boards of their portfolio firms. More 
importantly, they show that the quality of venture capitalists' monitoring services appears 
to be recognized by capital markets through lower under-pricing for IPOs with better 
monitors. 
20 
The opposite of specialization - diversification — suggests taking the opposite view. 
Total risk (the variability in asset returns) has two components: systematic or market risk 
and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk arises from the effects of market or economy-
wide influences on the returns to each asset. Unsystematic risk arises from firm, 
industry, or other asset-specific effects. By constructing a diversified portfolio, nearly 
all unsystematic risk can be diversified away, leaving an investor exposed only to 
systematic risk influences. Theoretically speaking, with a diversified portfolio, 
unfortunate circumstances that hurt returns on some assets are balanced by situations that 
increase returns on some other assets. 
Without doubt, private equity investors are subject to a greater amount of 
unsystematic risk in each of their portfolio firms. Although they are by nature risk-
takers, they have to manage their risks carefully. They may want to diversify across 
different industries and companies in order to reduce their risk exposure in any one 
industry or product. There is a general perception that early stage investments carry 
greater amounts of risk (see, for example, Ruhnka and Young, 1991) although it is 
associated with potentially higher returns. Therefore, the intention to diversify may be 
especially strong for investors with focus on seed and first stage investments. 
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To investigate which strategy, diversification or specialization, will win in the Asian 
context, I arbitrarily choose the diversification view and use it to set up three more 
hypotheses. 
H2: More stage-diversified PEFs have higher investment performance than 
those which are stage-focused. 
H3: More industry-diversified PEFs have higher investment performance than 
those which are industry-focused. 
H4： More country-diversified PEFs have higher investment performance than 
those which are country-focused. 
Adding one more element on the discussion may produce a different, or at least 
more insightful picture. Regarding the size of funds, as funds get bigger, diversification 
plays an important role. Ironically, many venture capital firms, the so-called risk-takers, 
are involved in portfolio and diversification management and cannot afford to spend 
much time with young companies. Ultimately, venture capital is a high risk business 
and diversification perhaps is desirable. Also, having more funds raised to compete in 
the industry means less investment opportunities will be available. If specialization 
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strategy is adopted, it will only further limit the available investment opportunities and 
this is certainly undesirable. 
H5: Larger PEFs prefer greater industry diversity, stage diversity, and broader 
geographic scope than do the smaller ones. 
Compensation Issues 
The compensation system plays a critical role in aligning the interest of the venture 
capitalists and the limited partners (Sahlman, 1990). Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
confirm the reputation and certification role of venture capital in a study. They use a 
matched sample of IPOs with venture backing and IPOs without venture backing and find 
significantly less under-pricing in those issues with venture capital backing. They note 
that with this reputation and certification role in mind, newly formed PEFs would be 
willing to accept a lower compensation, hoping that success will breed success and future 
compensation will rise accordingly if their performance of the new fund is good enough. 
Further, they suggest that an implied signaling effect is there which signals to the 
investors that a high compensation requirement represents a better quality fund 
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Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (1999) examine 419 partnerships in the U.S. and 
concluded that no relation was observed between incentive compensation and 
performance of new and smaller funds. They report that these funds display 
considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds. 
The authors argue that in their early funds, the venture capitalists will work hard even ‘ 
without explicit pay-for-performance incentives because, if they can establish a good 
reputation for either selecting attractive investments or adding value to firms in their 
portfolios, they will gain additional compensation in later funds. The authors also point 
out that these reputation concerns lead to lower pay-for-performance provisions for 
smaller and younger venture organizations and that once reputation has been established, 
however, explicit incentive compensation is needed to induce the proper effort levels. 
Instead of focusing on whether or not small and new firms would accept a lower 
compensation as the past researchers did, I believe that the basic and more important 
question is whether higher compensation would translate into better investment 
performance, which is an issue that receives very little attention. 
H6a: The higher the management fee, the better the investment 
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performance. 
H6b: The higher the percentage of carried interest, the better the 
investment performance. 
Board seat 
In the PEF-entrepreneur relationship, PEFs face many information problems and 
they close the information gap and thereby reduce the agency costs normally by 
conducting due diligence and taking a seat on the board of the portfolio company (for 
evidence, please see, for example, Fried et aL 1998)). Although reputation-building is 
in effect, i.e., firms having entrepreneurs with proven track records would receive better 
evaluations and less monitoring than other firms, the problem of asymmetric information 
is still a worry of venture capitalists. 
As a result of the due diligence process at the time the deal is done, both the 
managers and the venture partners have extensive and detailed knowledge of virtually all 
aspects of business. The close relationship between venture fund partners and the 
operating companies facilitates the infusion of expertise from the board during times of 
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crisis. It is not unusual for a partner to join the management team, even as CEO, to help 
an organization through such emergencies. 
Therefore, private equity investors or venture capitalists are there to reduce agency 
costs and any information problems. It is expected that they would deliver a superior 
investment performance. 
H7: Private equity funds requiring a seat on the board in portfolio companies 
have better investment performance when compared to those who do not 
have this requirement. 
General Partners Holdings 
General partners in private equity funds usually invest in the funds they manage, 
with only a few percentage points of holdings. This would also help reduce the agency 
problem between the fund investors (limited partners) and general partners. Again, this 
issue has been largely neglected by researchers in this field. 
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H8: The higher the general partners ownership of the fund, the better the 
investment performance of the fund. 
Percent Ownership in Portfolio Firms 
ft 
Wealth-constrained entrepreneurs may give up control even if the change in 
management imposes a greater loss of private benefit to them than a monetary gain to the 
company (Hellmann, 1998). However, this does not mean that PEFs are wiiiing to take 
up the controlling share of the portfolio companies. 
There are benefits to large investors. They have both the interest in getting their 
money back and the power to demand it. But these benefits are not without costs. The 
most obvious of these costs, which is also the usual argument for the benefits of dispersed 
ownership, is that large investors are not diversified, and hence bear excessive risk (see, 
for example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). 
"A more fundamental problem, however, is that the large investors represent their 
own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm, or 
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with the interests of employees and managers. In the process of using his control rights 
to maximize his own welfare, the large investor can therefore redistribute wealth - in 
both efficient and inefficient ways - from others" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.758). 
In the private equity world, venture capitalists typically would not require a 
controlling share of ownership in portfolio companies (allow the entrepreneurs to be the 
major shareholders) primarily for two reasons. One, it reduces risks and allows some 
room for other venture capitalists to come in and share the risks. Two, there is a huge 
cost behind a controlling interest. A non-controlling share of ownership of 
entrepreneurs would affect their enthusiasm and reduce their sense of ownership, and 
eventually, the performance of the new ventures. In the final analysis, the vision and 
vigor of the entrepreneurs determine the success of any new venture. 
H9: Private equity investors who do not require a controlling share of 
ownership in portfolio firm would have better performance than those who 
have this requirement. 
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Human Capital 
In examining the value added by venture capitalists in four countries (the U.S., the 
U.K., the Netherlands, and France), Sapienza et al. (1996) argue that venture capitalists' 
experience may be the most critical factor determining the amount of value added 
received through interaction. However, they also point out the possibility that 
experienced venture capitalists will interact less with CEOs and will therefore add less 
value to the ventures than inexperienced venture capitalists. However, to interact less 
does not mean to add less value. Further, the investment performance may not be 
affected. In other words, investment experience is far more important than frequency of 
interaction with CEOs in determining investment performance. 
The relationship between experience and venture capital firm investment 
performance is also indirectly supported by Sapienza's (1992) study where a hypothesis 
that the value of venture capitalist involvement will be positively related to new venture 
performance is proposed and strongly backed by empirical data. This finding is related 
to my following hypothesis as I assume new venture performance is directly proportional 
to venture capital firm performance. 
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HlOa: The greater the experience of the venture capitalists, the better the 
investment performance. 
Another aspect of the human capital of the private equity firm is the number of 
professionals in the firm. 
HlOb: The greater the number of investment professionals in a private 
equity firm, the better the investment performance. 
Investment Flexibility 
As investment opportunities in Asia are considered limited, an increase in 
investment flexibility (lower the minimum investment allowed and increase the 
maximum investment allowed) is important for market survival. 
Hll : The greater the investment flexibility, the better the investment 
performance. 
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V RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The whole idea of this research is to relate different characteristics of PEFs to their 
investment performance. The following characteristics of PEFs are measured (see the 
structure of questionnaire in Appendix II): 
General Information 
• Firm Type 
• Number of Investment Professionals 
• Average Number of Years of Investment Experience 
• Number of funds managed 
• Asset Under Management 
• Source of Capital 
• Fund Investor Diversity 
Structure 
• Structure (limited partnership or not) 
• Management Fee 
• Percentage of Carried Interests 
• Percentage of General Partners' Ownership 
Investment Strategy 
• Stage Diversity 
• Industry Diversity 
• Country Diversity 
• Total Number of Firms Invested 
• Percentage of Total Net Assets Invested in One Single Portfolio Company 
• Requirement of Board Seats 
• Percentage Stake Hold in a Portfolio Company 
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• Investment Flexibility 
Their investment performance are measured in four different ways: 
• Gross Internal Rate of Return 
• Percentage of Investment that can Realize Profit 
• Percentage of Exit-able Investment 
• Percentage of Investment that can Exit via an IPO 
With this in mind, several types statistical analysis are applied to analyze the survey 
data. These analysis include independent sample T-tests, correlation, multiple 
regression and ANOVA. I use SPSS 9.0 in analyzing the data. 
Data Collection 
A concise, one-page questionnaire, consisting of four parts relating to the general 
information, structure, investment strategy and investment performance of PEFs was 
designed (see Appendix II). 440 Asian venture capital firms were randomly selected in 
The 2000 Guide To Venture Capital in Asia, published by The Asian Venture Capital 
Journal. The Guide is the most comprehensive list of venture capital firms across the 
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Asia and is publicly available. A cover letter personally addressed to the senior 
management in each PEF was faxed. The 440 questionnaires were faxed and two weeks 
after, follow-up telephone calls were made to all Hong Kong venture capital firms. For 
the non-Hong Kong venture capital firms, I sent the questionnaire again to enhance the 
response rate. 
The data collected for this study included questionnaire responses from 44 venture 
capitalists across the Asia, representing a response rate of 10.0%, which is acceptable in 
doing such a cross-country survey. One important thing is that other than this 44 
responses, I received more than 10 other responses where some of the respondents told 
me that they are "fund-of-funds" and they are not the appropriate firms to respond to this 
survey. Some of them, on the other hand, said they have already terminated their 
businesses. Therefore there is at least a reason to believe that the 440 firms I tried to 
contact are not the effective sample size. This suggests that the effective response rate 
of this study should be somewhat higher than 10%. Another possible reason explaining 
this response rate is that venture capitalists, who are the targets in this study, are 
sophisticated investors and they see little reason why this study can add value to their 
businesses. One fortunate thing is that the responses received are extremely high quality: 
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most of them are completed responses and 40 out of the 44 respondents request a 
summary of my final analysis. The high quality response to a large extent can 
compensate for the not-high-enough response rate. 
To supplement the data generated by the survey, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with several private equity investors and analysts in order to gain qualitative insights into 
the general industry practices. A total of six people were interviewed. Four of them 
are existing market players. The rest of them are an ex-merchant bankers and an ex-
private equity analyst. The information collected from these interviews is not included 
in the quantitative analysis but is used to "flesh out" the interpretation of the results. 
Measures 
Other than the constructs directly derived from the questionnaire, I have developed 
the following new constructs: 
• Fund Investor Diversity Index (FIDI): measured by the number of types of fund 
investors investing in the private equity fund; the greater the number, the more 
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diversified the investor base. 
• Stage Diversity Index (SDI): measured by the number of stage (adding up the 
number of stage the respondent checked) the private equity fund would invest 
in; the greater the number, the greater the stage diversity. 
• Industry Diversity Index (IDI): measured by the number of industry the private 
equity fund would invest in; the greater the number, the greater the industry 
diversity and breadth. 
• Country Diversity Index (GDI): measured by the number of country the private 
equity fund would invest in; the greater the number, the greater the country 
diversity. 
• Total Net Assets Diversity Index (TNADI): most private equity funds have set 
a maximum percentage of total net assets that can be invested in a single 
portfolio company, the lower the percentage, the higher the potential for more 
diversity; this index is calculated by subtracting the maximum percentage from 
one (for example, when the maximum percentage is 15%, or 0.15, this index 
equals to 1 - 0.15, which is 0.85 (the greater the number, the larger the diversity 
of investment). 
• Investment Flexibility (Flexibility): most of the private equity funds have set 
35 
both minimum and maximum investment amounts. The difference of the two 
represents the flexibility allowed for investment. The greater the number, the 
larger the investment flexibility. 
Regarding the investment performance, the dependent variable of this study, the 
most common method to evaluate the performance of a private equity fund is to use the 
gross internal rate of return (G-IRR). Other than using gross IRR as one of the primary 
indicators of investment performance, I also try to assess the investment performance in a 
variety of ways. 
The percentage of investment that can realize profit (above-cost value) is an 
interesting statistic to consider (the related construct is called Profit). On the other hand, 
many people believe that the key to private equity investment is the exit strategy. In fact, 
PEFs may exit an investment in a number of ways. The most common avenues for 
exiting a successful venture are via an IPO or a merger. Gladstone (1988) describes 
some other ways of concluding a venture capital investment including repurchase of the 
shares by the company, reorganizations of the company, and liquidation of the company� 
An initial public offering is often thought of as the desired end of a venture capital 
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investment. Though merger or acquisition of the portfolio firm is also a possibility, 
market valuations are higher for IPOs than for acquisitions, according to Norton (1993). 
In view of this, two other measures are used for evaluating investment performance. 
One is the percentage of investment that can have a successful exit (Exit_Yes). Two is 
the percentage of investment that can exit via an IPO (IPO—Yes). 
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VI RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the surveyed PEFs and the data is directly 
drawn from the questionnaire responses. More than 30% of the respondents come from 
Hong Kong. The second largest "contributor" of this research is Singapore, followed by 
Taiwan. Regarding the venture capital type, there are more independent venture 
capitalists, which account for more than 46% in my sample, than the other two categories. 
Most of the surveyed funds have professionals with 2-10 years of investment experience. 
Most of the funds do not have more than 20 full-time equivalent staff. The total assets 
under management is diverse: about 30% of them have no more than US$100m of assets 
under management whereas almost 25% of them manage assets worth more than 
US$500m. 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
N Valid percent 
Regional Headquarters 
Hong Kong 14 31.8 
China 1 2.3 
Taiwan 6 13.6 
Japan 5 11.4 
Korea 2 4.5 
Singapore 11 25.0 
Other 5 11.4 
TOTAL 44 100.0 
VC Type 
Independent VC 20 47.6 
Corporate VC 7 16.7 
VC backed by financial institution 15 35.7 
Missing 2 ---
TOTAL 44 100.0 
Years of Investment Experience 
2-5 22 56.4 
6-10 15 38.5 
> 10 3 7.7 
Missing 5 — 
TOTAL 44 100.0 
No. of Funds Managed 
1_5 30 76.9 
6-10 4 10.3 
11-30 5 12.8 
Missins 5 — 
TOTAL 44 100.0 
No. of Full-time Staff 
2-10 23 54.8 
11-20 12 28.6 
21-150 7 16.7 
Missing 2 — 
TOTAL 44 100.0 
Asset Under Management 
<US$10M 1 2.4 
US$10-25M 3 7.1 
US$25-50M 7 16.7 
US$50-lOOM 6 14.3 
US$100-200M 8 19.0 
US$200-300M 2 4.8 
US$300-500M 5 11.9 
>US$500M 10 23.8 
Missing 2 — 
TOTAL 44 100.0 
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Test of Hypothesis 10a & 10b 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that PEFs with limited partnership structure, the most popular 
one in the industry, have better investment performance than other PEFs do. Responses 
to Section D of the questionnaire provide the required information for constructing the 
performance measures?. Table 2 indicates that the predicted relationship between the 
preferred structure and performance is not supported (there is no significance 
performance difference between the two structures), no matter which investment 
performance measure I use. When I use percentage of profitable investment as the 
performance measure, the result actually indicates that the reverse relationship holds: the 
non-limited partnership structure outperforms the limited partnership structure (p = 
0.109). These findings agree with what Gompers and Lerner (1998) found. They 
concluded in their paper that the structure of corporate venture funds is not a critical 
barrier. 
7 In the questionnaire, I ask respondents to indicate a rang of values for gross IRR. In the statistical 
analysis, I use 1 to 7 to represent the different ranges (for example, I use 1 to represent <5% gross IRR, 2 to 
represent 5-10% IRR and so on.). 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Jf Mean 
HI G-IRR Limited Partnership 16 4.0000 
Non-Limited Partnership 17 4.3529 
Levene's test: F = 0.049 Significance = 0.825 
Mean difference = -0.3529 t = -0.742 Significance = 0.464 
% of Profitable Investment Limited Partnership 15 56.8333 
Non-Limited Partnership 15 69.5333 
Levene's test: F 二 Significance = 0.006 
Mean difference = -12.7000 t = -1.674"" Significance = 0.109 
% nf Successful Exit Limited Partnership 16 57.5000 
Non-Limited Partnership 15 64.3333 
Levene's test: F = 1.712 Significance 二 0.201 
Mean difference = -6.833 t 二 -0.803 Significance = 0.428 
% of Investment Rxit via an IPO Limited Partnership 16 43 7500 
Non-Limited Partnership 15 46.0000 
Levene's test: F = Significance = 0.087 
Mean difference 二 -2.2500 l 二 -0.243 Significance 二 0.810 
矛-p<0.10 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
« N does not always equal to 44，the total number of respondent as some respondents are reluctant to 
disclose their performance figures. 
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Test of Hypothesis 10a & 10b 
Hypothesis 2 relates Stage Diversity Index, SDI, to the four performance measures 
and predicts that the more stage-diversified PEFs enjoy higher investment performance 
than the stage-focused ones. This hypothesis receives modest support as the 
independent variable, SDI (Stage Diversity Index), explains 11.3% of variance (positive 
beta) of one of the dependent variables, IPO—Yes (p<0.1). However, it has no 
relationship with the other three performance measures, namely, G-IRR (Gross Internal 
Rate of Return), Profit (Percent of Profitable Investment), and Exit—Yes (Percent of 
Investments that have Successful Exit). One possible reason explaining this result is 
that the more stage-diversified private equity funds involved in different stages of new 
venture development (e.g., invest in both early-stage and pre-IPO firms) and hence, better 
understand the needs and requirements for listing. However, its weak relationship with 
other performance measures suggesting that bringing firms to IPO is not necessarily a 
profit-making action. 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta F 
m SDI G-IRR 0.066 0.256 2.181 
Profit 0.013 0.115 0.375 
Exit-Yes 0.044 0.210 1.343 
IPO_Yes 0.113 0.336 
* p < 0 . 1 0 
* * p < 0.05 
***p<0.01 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 relates Industry Diversity Index, IDI, to the four performance measures 
and predicts that the more industry-diversified PEFs have higher investment performance 
than the industry-focused PEFs. It turns out that there is no relationship between the 
two variables, using any of the four performance measures. This strongly suggests that 
industry does not play a role in determining the investment performance of a private 
equity firm, perhaps because it is easy to hire industry experts, even if the private equity 
investors themselves are not. Another possible reason is there are some other factors 
which are much more important than this to explain the success of a private equity firm. 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta E 
H3 IDI G-IRR 0.000 -0.012 0.005 
Profit 0.000 -0.011 0.003 
Exit_Yes 0.04 0.200 1.209 
IPO_Yes 0.011 -0.106 0.329 
Test of Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the more country-diversified PEFs would outperform the 
country-focused PEFs. Again, country does not play any role in determining the 
success of the Asian private equity firm and it is contrast to the conventional wisdom 
(being more focused in some particular countries to build connections would help 
increase performance) and to the actual descriptive data that the study has (almost 60% of 
the surveyed funds invest in three or less than three countries in the region and it is 
expected that being more country-focused would either positively or negatively affect the 
performance. The most convincing reason to explain this perhaps is that private equity 
investors are more deal-specific than country-specific. They are looking for good deals 
all over the region and most of the funds have actually a regional focus, not country focus. 
Also, it should be noted that it is difficult to segment PEFs into country funds. 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Independent Dependent R Sqmirc BfUL E 
H4 GDI G-IRR 0.029 0.171 0.811 
Profit 0.002 0.045 0.051 
Exit—Yes 0.051 0.226 1.399 
IPO_Ycs 0..041 0.203 1.115 
Test of Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that larger PEFs (larger asset under management, Asselman) 
prefer greater stage (SDl), industry (IDI) and country (CDI) diversities. Results show 
strong support, especially for the relationship between size of PEFs and country diversity. 
This matches the findings reported by Gupta and Sapienza (1992) where one of their 
results is that larger venture capital firms prefer greater industry diversity and hroudcr 
izeographic scope than do the smaller ones. The intuition is that for PEFs which have 
much assets under management, if they do not go lor diversity, either geographical or 
industriaL it is likely that they would not find sufficient investments opportunities. In 
other words, diversification is a motivation for their spending decisions. 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta E 
H5 Assetman SDI 0.06 0.245 2.499 
IDI 0.069 0.263 2 .9 (m 
CDI 0.141 0.375 SAOe^'' 
*p<0 .10 
* * p < 0.05 
Test of Hypothesis 6a & 6b 
Hypothesis 6a predicts that the higher the management fee received by general 
partners, the better the investment performance of the private equity fund. Similarly, 
hypothesis 6b predicts that the higher the percentage of carried interests'), the better the 
performance. Unfortunately, both hypotheses, which are theoretically supported by both 
the learning (for inexperienced venture capitalists seeking for learning opportunities and 
opportunities to demonstrate their abilities, hoping that in the future, they would receive 
higher management fee and carried interests) and signaling models (for experienced 
venture capitalists who have proven track records and abilities), receive no support from 
the empirical analysis. The implication is that even the experienced venture capitalists 
could not justify their high management fee and carried interests by outperforming the 
9 Normally, other than management fee, general partners of a private equity fund share a percentage of total 
realized (after-cost) investment profit (usually 20%) and this is called carried interests. This motivates the 
general partners to maximize the returns. 
46 
competitors. It is possible that some uncontrollable factors are affecting the situation. 
Table 7: Results of Hypothesis 6 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta F 
H6a Man_Fee G-IRR 0.006 -0.075 0.135 
Profit 0.007 0.087 0.166 
Exit_Yes 0.028 -0.166 0.682 
IPO_Yes 0.061 -0.248 1.570 
H6b Carried G-IRR 0.001 -0.028 0.018 
Profit 0.047 0.217 1.039 
Exit-Yes 0.000 0.005 0.001 
IPO—Yes 0.015 -0.122 0.348 
Test of Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that PEFs requiring a seat on the board in portfolio companies 
would demonstrate better performance than those who do not have this requirement. 
Table 4 shows the statistical results and indicates clearly that the performance of private 
equity firms has nothing to do with presence on the board of portfolio company. This 
partially matches the findings of Daily and Dalton (1992)，who investigate the 
relationship between governance structure and corporate performance in entrepreneurial 
firms and propose that (1) fewer total outside directors will be associated with lower firm 
performance, and (2) the higher the proportion of outside directors, the higher the firm 
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performance. They report that these two hypotheses received only modest support. 
Table 8: Summary of Hypothesis 7 
N Mean 
H7 G-IRR Presence on the board 27 4.2222 
No Presence 6 4.0000 
Levene's test: F = 0.02 Significance = 0.961 
Mean difference = 0.2222 t = 0.358 Significance : 0.723 
% of Profitable Investment Presence on the board 24 62.9375 
No Presence 6 64.1667 
Levene's test: F = 0.051 Significance = 0.823 
Mean difference = -1.2292 t = -0.124 Significance = 0.903 
% of Successful Exit Presence on the board 25 58.0000 
No Presence 6 72.5000 
Levene's lest: F = 0.033 Significance = 0.857 
Mean difference = -14.5000 t = -1.376 Significance = 0.179 
% of Investment Fxit via an IPO Presence on the board 25 44.0000 
No Presence 6 48.3333 
Levene's test: F = 0.470 Significance = 0.499 
Mean difference 二 -4.3333 t 二 -0.375 Significance = 0.711 
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Test of Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis 8 predicts that the higher the general partners' ownership of the fund 
(GPartner), the better the investment performance. The empirical results suggest that 
there is no relationship between the two. This may be because the reduced agency costs 
(by increasing ownership of general partners) is somewhat offset by the extra risk the 
general partners are bearing and the loss of their independence. 
Table 9: Results of Hypothesis 8 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta F 
H8 GPartner G-IRR 0.101 0.318 1.572 
Profit 0.047 0.217 0.689 
Exit_Yes 0.091 0.302 1.405 
IPO_Yes 0.102 0.320 1.597 
Test of Hypothesis 9 
Hypothesis 9 predicts that PEFs who do not require a controlling share of ownership 
in portfolio firms would outperform the competitors who have this requirement. The 
empirical results show a significant difference between the two means but the implication 
is opposite to what this hypothesis is suggesting. Using either percent of profitable 
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investment or percent of successful exit as the performance measure, PEFs who require a 
controlling share in portfolio firms outperform the ones who do not. However, this 
result may not be reliable enough as the number of firms for the PEFs who require 
controlling share ownership is extremely small to be representative (only 2). 
Table 10: Results of Hypothesis 9 
N Mean 
H9 G-IRR Controlling share 3 5.0000 
Non-controlling 30 4.1000 
Levene's test: F = 2.610 Significance = 0.116 
Mean difference = 0.9000 I 二 1.099 Significance 二 0.280 
% of Profitable Investment Controlling share 2 80.0000 
Non-controlling 28 61.9821 
Levene's test: F = 3.867 Significance = 0.059""� 
Mean difference = 18.0179 I = 4.397 Significance = 洲 沪 * * 
cjr of Successful Exit Controlling share 2 80.0000 
Non-controlling 29 59.4828 
Levene's test: F = 3.456 Significance = 0.073-
Mean difference 二 20.5172 t = 4.649 Significance = 
% nf Tnvestmp.nt Rxit via an IPO Controlling share 2 55.0000 
Non-controlling 29 44.1379 
Levene's test: F = 2.589 Significance = 0.118 
Mean difference = 10.8621 t = 0.586 Significance = 0.563 
* p < 0 . 1 0 
* * p < 0.05 
***p<0.01 
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Test of Hypothesis 10a & 10b 
Hypothesis 10a predicts that the greater the number of professional staff (No.Staff) 
in the private equity fund, the better the investment performance. The statistical tests 
show a seemingly encouraging result when using G-IRR (p<0.01)and Profit (p<0.10) as 
the performance measure. However, the betas are negative. This suggests that quality, 
instead of quantity is important in this industry. 
Hypothesis 10b predicts that the greater the experience (Year—Exp, expressed in 
years) of the venture capitalists, the better the performance. This hypothesis receives 
strong support when I use Exit—Yes as the performance measure. This, in my view, 
shows how difficult it is to make profits in the Asian private equity industry. The results 
imply that even the experienced venture capitalists can only make investments exit-able, 
not profitable. Further, it means experience does not provide any guarantee in terms of 
profit in the Asian private equity market. 
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Table 11: Results of Hypothesis 10 
Independent Dependent R Square Beta F 
HlOa No.Staff G-IRR 0.244 -0.494 
Profit 0.104 -0.323 3.264^' 
Exit-Yes 0.017 -0.130 0.501 
IPO_Yes 0.079 -0.280 2.475 
HlOb Year_Exp G-IRR 0.000 0.022 0.015 
Profit 0.051 0.225 1.495 
Exit_Yes 0.113 0.336 3.5 似 ** 
IPO—Yes 0.059 0.243 1.751 
* p < 0 . 1 0 
** p < 0 .05 
***p<0.01 
Test of Hypothesis 11 
Hypothesis 11 predicts that the greater the investment flexibility, the better the 
investment performance. The empirical results show no support for this hypothesis, no 
matter which performance measure I use. One interpretation of the results is that the 
Asian private equity industry is a place where people feel it is hard to make money 
because even the flexibility increases (by either increasing the maximum allowable 
investment or reducing the minimum allowable investment or both), there is no 
significant improvement in returns. Another interpretation is that when private equity 
investors increase their investment flexibility (hoping that they would then be exposed to 
more profitable investment opportunities), they are breaking their principles (initially not 
52 
wanting to invest in too small and too big investments) and this would possibly have an 
adverse effect on investment returns (involvement in too small an investment can not 
generate much return and involvement in too big an investment would greatly increase 
the risk involved), balancing off the benefits gained by being more flexible. 
Table 12: Results of Hypothesis 11 
Independent Dependent R Sqwrc B^la E 
Hll Flexibil i ty G - I R R 0.041 0 . 2 0 3 1.251 
Profi t 0.011 0 . 1 0 3 0.291 
Exit—Yes 0 .04 0 .201 丨 .136 
IPO—Yes 0.071 0 .267 2 .072 
The Multiple Regression Model 
The final analysis of this paper is the mulliple regression model, which uses all the 
high-order variables (interval- or ratio-scale variables) to regress against the four 
performance measures. Table 6 shows the results that in using G-IRR as the 
performance measure. No.Staff (number of professionals) has a strong (p=0.01) but 
negative (beta 二 -0.66) relationship with the performance measure. When I use Profit 
(percent of investments that can generate profits) as the performance measure, in addition 
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to No.Staff, another variable, Assetman (size of the firm in terms of asset under 
management) enters the model (p=0.014; beta = 0.589) and collectively they explain 61% 
of the variance. When I use Exit_Yes as the performance measure, no variable is 
selected in the model. When I use IPO_Yes instead, No.funds (number of funds the 
private equity firm currently managing) enters the model (p=0.025; beta=-0.593) but has 
a negative relationship with the performance measure. This suggests that the larger the 
number of funds a private equity firm manages, the worse the investment performance. 
Overall, there are only a few variables that significantly relate to the performance 
measure and at most they explain about 60% of the variance. This implies that there is a 
large portion of variance left and unexplainable. 
54 
Table 13: Results of Multiple Regression Model 
Dependent variable: G-IRR 
Model Tndependent variable(s) R Square B ^ a Significance 
1 No.Staff 0.436 -0.660 OMIO 絲 
Dependent variable: Profit 
Model Independent variahle(s) R Square Beta Significance 
1 No.Staff 0.305 -0.553 0.04^ 
2 No staff 0.610 -0.757 0.003林 
Assetman 0.589 0.014尔 
Dependent variable: Exit_Yes 
All variables were removed. 
Dependent variable: IPO_Yes 
Model TnHpppndent ynriahlefs) R Square Beta Significance 
1 No.funds 0.351 -0.593 0.025怒 
* p < 0 . 1 0 
料 p < 0.05 
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VII CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study have some important implications for the private equity 
industry. First, continuously seeking for diversification as a means to control risk only 
seems to be a winning strategy for large-sized venture capitalists. For other venture 
capitalists, certain amount of diversification at the investment stage is desirable, but does 
not appear to be the case in relation to industries or countries. However, this is not to 
say that specialization is the way to go, as suggested by the empirical analysis of this 
study. Perhaps the two seemingly contradictory arguments (diversification and 
specialization) may co-exist and a mixed approach should be used by private equity 
investors to enjoy the benefits of both specialization and diversification. Within a 
country focus, for example, a PEF can diversify its portfolio across difierent stages and 
industries. Similarly, within a stage focus, a PEF can diversify its portfolio across 
different countries and industries. Finally, within an industry focus, a PEF can diversify 
its portfolio across different stages and countries. Further, a PEF can have a dual focus 
on, for example, both industry and country, and then diversify its portfolio across 
different stages. Using this mixed approach, the benefits of both specialization and 
diversification can be obtained and it is hoped that investment performance can be 
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enhanced. Based on the empirical analysis of this study, the strategy which has the 
largest chance to win is to specialize in an industry (in hypothesis 3, the IDI tends to 
show negative relationship with the performance measure, although they are not 
statistically significant) and to diversify across different stages and countries (in 
hypothesis 2 and 4, however, SDI and GDI tend to show positive relationship with 
performance measures, although most of them are not statistically significant). 
Second, it is clear that investment returns depend not just on those factors / variables, 
which are more internal and largely controllable) examined in this study. Indeed, there 
are some other factors, which tend to be more uncontrollable and external, affecting the 
investment performance of the Asian private equity players. Some merchant bankers 
and private equity analysts suggest the following reasons: (1) cultural ditterences; there 
are always problems when West meets East. Also, even if the funds are raised by the 
people in this region, the heterogeneous and fragmented Asian markets suggest that there 
are significant cultural differences among Asian countries. (2) regulatory problems and 
inefficient capital market; venture capitalists always complain about the difficulty to exit 
from their investments in Asia because of the illiquid IPO markets. (3) political 
instability; not surprisingly, the politically and economically unstable Asian markets 
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present a huge challenge for both experienced and inexperienced venture capitalists. (4) 
insufficient deal flow and investment opportunities; most investment opportunities are 
too small and in Asia, private equity investors find it difficult to obtain innovative and 
real high-tech companies to invest in. Even worse, many companies in Asia are family-
owned (not-for-sale companies). To add two more points, I believe (1) the timing fund 
raising would also have some bearing on the performance of the fund because of the 
cyclical characteristic of the industry; (2) the unsatisfactory performance of most Asian 
private equity funds is also driven by the unrealistic set of expectations developed for 
returns. To a large extent, the expectations were based on returns from the Western 
world (mainly the U.S.), which has a very different business environment to Hong Kong 
and Asia in general. 
The findings reported need to be evaluated in light of the study's limitations. Chief 
among these is the insufficient size of my sample. Although the quality of the responses 
are excellent, more convincing arguments could have been developed had the response 
rate been higher. This is also the principal reason explaining why I have not included 
some of my findings, though interesting, in this conclusion part. This is because from a 
statistical point of view, some of the results I produce are not convincing enough. 
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Second is the severe limitation on the public availability of data on PEFs, the study 
focused on their investment preferences rather than the actual pattern of their investments. 
Another limitation is the possible presence of a non-response bias which often a 
drawback of questionnaires. Furthermore, there are some deficiencies of using 
questionnaire approach. First, researcher / interviewer cannot deal with qualifications to 
responses, for example, "Yes, but..." or "It depends..." where only Yes/No are given as 
options. Second, researcher / interviewer cannot make sure that the questionnaires are 
actually responded by the target people, rather than their assistants or even secretaries. 
Third, respondents may try to avoid sensitive questions like actual figures of their 
investment performance or they may overstate or understate the figures. 
This study contributes to the limited body of literature on the Asian private equity 
industry and on the performance literature within this field. Future research can be 
directed to examine more on the investment patterns of private equity players in Asia. 
Furthermore, more longitudinal studies are welcome because a cross-sectional type of 
research has many limitations for this industry (for example, some of the private equity 
funds responded to my survey and said that they are still in the liquidation stage (or yet to 
reach that stage) so that they could not provide me the performance figures. 
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APPENDIX I 
Figure 1: Asian Venture Capital Pool from 1991-1998 
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Figure 2: New Funds Raised in Asia (1991-1998) 
I ~ — “ “ ‘ ~ ^ “ I 
Asia: New Funds Raised By Year I 
I ！ 
i 
j J^ ^ jlj/j V. j 
力 「 7,425 I 
1 7,500 知册 r i — 
c S^IR r ~ L 5,647 5，937 � 
o 6,000 X i d L —T：:::::^-!—Tf—�-
^ ^ 、、 、 、 ？ 、、、、、"^、、 -二 
S A ^ n n >、:？：——二、’——、——々 ”——、〜、…、、― 
S 3,000 
• 
iiiiiiiii I t � 
1 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘：、 ： 、：、、、、：:“、 、、、、、 一、 1,500 -，。一 ？’ ； 一 ,；： 一： f 〜 ” 、 
、 、 ， . ’ . ‘ ： - 、：V \ 
二 • , I ‘ 丨 � ". I I � I I � i I 瞧�� i 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
- — — 
Source: The 2000 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, Asian Venture Capital Journal 
6 0 
Figure 3: Sources of Asian Venture Capital in 1998 
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Figure 4: Geographical Breakdown of Venture Capital Sources in Asia, 1998 
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Figure 5: Annual Venture Capital Investment in Asia (1992-1998) 
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Figure 6: Venture Capital Investment Portfolio in Asia (US$M), 1991-1998 
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Figure 7: Disbursements By Financing Stage in Asia Private Equity Industry, 1998 
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Figure 8: Disbursements to Companies By Region, 1998 
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Table 14: Geographical Distribution of Venture Capital in Asia, 1998 
Geographical Distribution of Venture Capital In Asia 1998 
(US$ million)  
Country Capital Under Percent Of Number o f P e r c e n t of Total 
Management Total Funds  
"Australia �6—6—乏 6.7% 85 9.3% 
Hong Kong/China 15,442 33.7% 129 14.1% 
India 1,053 2.3% 41 4.5% 
Indonesia 328 0.7% 46 5.0% 
Japan 12,513 27.3% 231 25.2% 
Korea 2,995 6.5% 123 13.4% 
Malaysia 460 1.0% 20 2.2% 
Myanmar 83 0.2% 2 0.2% 
New Zealand 186 0.4% 13 1.4% 
Pakistan 15 0.0% 3 0.3% 
Philippines 224 11.5% 10 IA% 
Singapore 5,258 11.5% 64 7.0% 
Sri Lanka 68 0.1% 12 1.3% 
Taiwan 3,598 7.9% 124 13.5% 
Thailand 242 0.5% 8 0.9% 
Vietnam 258 0.6% 7 0.8% 
TotaY 45,785 100.0% 918 100.0% 
Source: AVCJ ‘ 
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APPENDIX II: (QUESTIONNAIRE) 
Part A: General Information About Your Firm 
1. Where is the regional headquarters of your firm?  
2. Is your firm an independent VC / a corporate VC / a VC backed by a financial institution? (Please circle one answer) 
3. How many (full-time equivalent) investment / legal professionals currently work directly for your firm?  
4. Among your professionals, what is their average number of years of investment experience in the private equity 
industry: years 
5. What is the number of funds your firm is currently managing?  
6. What is the capital under management of your firm? (Please tick one) 
( )<US$10m ( ) US$10-25m ( ) US$25-50m ( ) US$50-100m 
( )US$100-200m ( ) US$200-300nn ( ) US$300-500m ( ) >US$500m 
7. What kinds of investors are investing in your fund? (Please tick all that apply) 
( )corporate pension funds ( ) insurance companies ( ) wealthy families and individuals 
( )non-financial corporations ( ) investment banks ( ) public pension funds 
( )endowments ( ) foundations ( ) bank holding companies 
( )other 
Part B: Structure of Your Firm 
8. Is your fund a limited private equity partnership? (Please circle one answer) Yes / No 
9. In general, what is the management fee you charge to the fund investors? % 
10. In general, what is the percentage of carried interests of your fund(s)? % 
11. In general, what percentage of fund do the general partners hold? % 
Part C: Investment Strategy of Your Firm 
12. What kinds of companies does your firm prefer to invest in? (Please tick all that apply) 
( )seed / R&D ( ) start-up / early stage ( ) expansion / development 
( )mezzanine / bridge finance ( ) turnaround / restructuring ( ) other  
13. What is the preferred industry of your funds? (Please tick all that apply) 
( )computer-related, software ( ) computer-related, hardware ( ) biotechnology 
( )medical instruments ( ) health services 
( )manufacturing (not computer-related) ( ) retail and wholesale 
( )telecommunications ( ) other business services ( ) other 
14. For your typical fund(s), what is the overall weighting across ALL Asian countries? 
( )mainland China ( ) Hong Kong ( ) Taiwan ( ) Singapore 
{ ) Japan ( ) Korea ( ) Malaysia ( ) Indonesia 
( )Thailand ( ) Other Asian countries 
15. What is the maximum percentage of Total Net Assets that can be invested in a single portfolio company? 
% 
16. What is the total number of firms invested by your firm?  
17. In general, do you require a seat on the board in your portfolio companies? (Please circle one answer) Yes / No 
18. On average, what is the percentage of equity stake your firm holds in portfolio companies? (Please tick one only) 
( )<10% ( ) 10-20% ( ) 20-30% ( ) 30-40% { ) 40-50% 
( )>50% 
19. What is the min. and max. investment your firm would consider respectively? Min: US$ ； Max: US$  
20. Which of the following is the most preferable exit strategy of your firm? (Please tick one only) 
( ) IPO ( ) private sale ( ) buybacks by the original owner(s) ( ) other  
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Part D: General Performance Measures 
21. Regarding all the funds managed by your firm which are currently in their liquidation periods or have been 
completely liquidated, what is the approximate average gross internal rate of return (IRR) percentage to the 
investors? (Please tick one only) 
( )<5% ( )5-10% ( ) 11-20% ( ) 21-30% ( ) 31-40% 
( )41-50% ( ) >50% 
22. Approximately, what is the percentage of investment that can realize profit (or an above-cost value)? % 
23. Approximately, what is the percentage of investment that can have a successful exit? % 
24. Approximately, what is the percentage of investment that can exit via an IPO? % • 
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